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Ascidian tadpole and Amphioxus. . . . The ultimate or primordial ancestor of the Vertebrates would be a worm-like animal whose organisation was approximately on a level with that of the bilateral ancestors of the Echinoderms," or, to quote Professor Osborn, who writes the Preface to the work, "it stands as a persistent specialised but not degenerate type, perhaps not far from the true ancestral line of the Vertebrates."

Mr. Willey's work is exhaustive, at least it will appear so to the general reader ; but a glance at the bibliography appended to the work, containing six pages of reference in small print, will show that in fact it is only an introduction to this tremendous subject. "No single group," says Professor Osborn, referring to the Protochordates, "illustrates more beautifully the principles of transformism. . . . They alone [the Ascidians] give us a whole chapter in Darwinism." In fact no biological subject could be more fascinating. The problems presented are sketched in the Introduction. We shall mention only the problem of Dohrn, which is of more recent interest. "According to him," says Mr. Willey, "not only were the Vertebrates *not* descended from forms allied to the Ascidians and Amphioxus, but the latter were, by a process of almost infinite *degeneration*, derived or degenerated from the former. That the Ascidians are degenerate animals, to the extent that they have become adapted to a fixed habit of life, is of course obvious ; but that they have phylogenetically undergone the immeasurable degeneration which was postulated by Dohrn, is a view which is entirely unjustified by facts." The first two chapters are devoted to the anatomy of Amphioxus, the third to the development of Amphioxus, the fourth to a brief sketch of the structure and development of the typical Ascidians, and the fifth to a consideration of the more abstruse relationships of the lower Vertebrates or Protochordates. The work concludes with a series of considerations on the features of transition between the craniate vertebrates, the protochordates, and the invertebrates. With its notes, illustrations, full index, good press-work, and fine treatment of its subject, Mr. Willey's work upholds the reputation which the Columbia Biological Series has already won for high excellence. T. J. McC.

THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE. Being an Attempt to Determine the First Principles of Metaphysic, Considered as an Inquiry Into the Conditions and Import of Consciousness. By *Edward Douglas Fawcett*. London : Edward Arnold. 1893. Pp., 440. Price, 14s.

"The object of this work is a Metaphysic which, stalking naked, but not "ashamed, among current iconoclasms, shall proffer a definite though necessarily "tentative, solution of the World-Riddle." This solution the author hopes to expand in a future series of works. The present volume which forms a sort of prelude to the promised system is divided into two parts. "In Part I is presented a "critical survey of the great *landmarks* in the history of modern philosophy, with "a *primary* reference to their bearing on *metaphysical* (as opposed to merely psycho-logical and other) inquiries. . . . Part II is constructive, a *development*, and, it is

"hoped, an extensive development, of Metaphysic out of the materials furnished by the great German masters. Incidentally Part II is critical, assailing: (a) the various phases of materialism, agnosticism, and current *destructive* idealism; (b) that too prevalent word-jugglery, termed by Schopenhauer 'University-philosophy,' where verbal erudition supplants insight, and dialectical chatter honest confrontation of the enigmas of life; (c) theology, and all metaphysic and ethic subservient to theology; (d) the defective side of modern mysticism," meaning by the "defective side" the aberrations of mysticism. In the constructive side of Part II are to be noted, to use the author's own list, "the treatment of the *crux* of the Individual Ego or Subject, the Subjective-Objective Idealism, the Monadology with its suggested amendments of Leibnitz and Herbart, the theories of Freedom and the relations of neurosis and psychosis, the exposition of the Universal Subject (including the synthesis of Atheism, Pantheism) and Theism, the answer to Pessimism and the riddle of Evil at large, the struggle for existence of Monads (as the metaphysical complement of Darwinism and *ἀνάγκη θεία* of the universe solving very numerous riddles), and the novel handling of palingenesis."

Mr. Fawcett writes a robust and picturesque style, at times almost verging on Orientalism. The vigor and the individuality of his expositions hold the attention of the reader throughout. It will be impossible for us within the brief space now at our disposal to do more than to refer to his chief positions. To criticise thoroughly his views would be to discuss the whole history of philosophy. We shall point out merely the idiosyncrasies of his views.

The method employed, not the only possible method, but still a very effective one, is called the "concrete metaphysical method," which is a "regress from the empirical in general to its grounds, thoroughgoing deduction of the empirical *in detail* from these grounds with the concrete ever in view." Concreteness, always concreteness, is its ideal. It is by the concrete method, not by abstractions, that the peak of the Absolute is to be scaled. The key to this philosophy is the "doctrine of a subject distinct from states of consciousness, though distinct in a way needing most careful treatment." Its initial formula "states of consciousness appear" is ultimately resolvable into "states of consciousness appear as content and revelation of a Subject,"—and that an *individual*, not a universal subject. "No Subject," Mr. Fawcett declares, "no flux of sensations in time; no Subject, no order of sensations in space; no Subject, no memory, no expectation; no Subject, no introspection; no Subject, no explicit I-reference." Now our states of consciousness have two sides—our mental consciousness and our object consciousness. This involves the problem of external perception which Mr. Fawcett attempts to solve "by a theory fusing the standpoints both of subjective and objective idealism." In this connexion a doctrine of Monadology is developed, which is the core and pride of Mr. Fawcett's philosophy. A monad is "a unitary individual centre of consciousness, actual or potential." Although applicable, as Mr. Fawcett thinks, and fit to replace the complicated and self-contradictory atomic theories of physics

and chemistry, in this place it is applied only to the solution of the general meta-physical problem. In the first place, we have a Universal Subject, called the Meta-consciousness. In this subject the monads are grounded, by it they are connected, although individually they are discreet and self-contained centres. In themselves the monads are subject simply to changes of state; but as upheld in the Universal Subject free interactions must be posited of them. In this interplay, in this interpenetration of the monads, the solution of the various problems is reached, including, of course, that of telepathy, and the possibility of mysticism.

It remains only to indicate Mr. Fawcett's solution of the problem of God, his reply to pessimism, and his theory of palingenesis. His view of God "constitutes a synthesis of the standpoints of Atheism, Pantheism, Theism, and even Agnosticism." Deity is found to emerge from the gloom of the Metaconscious, the Metaconscious being the black spiritual *prius* in which all the monads are immanent. "The God of Absolutism is all that is, ever was, or ever shall be—a unity of interpenetrative individuals who have bought their glory by suffering." According to Mr. Fawcett, the foundation of pessimism is a fact; "the reply to pessimism must hinge on the report we may be able to return of the individual's prospect beyond the grave. . . . *The fact is that, here as elsewhere, human ideals, unless they are to bear rich fruit in 'another world,' are a cheat of the emptiest nature.*" That other world is the future, for monads are immortal. "The Good, after all, must be fated to emerge from this torment. Hail, then, to the unborn future! The pains of the world accumulate *behind* us, but the banqueting-day, the revels of a Deity, are *ahead*." Again, pain and pleasure are the lieutenants of the Metaconscious. . . . Pain and pleasure are, broadly speaking, the servants of the animal body." The indictment of pessimism cannot be answered, unless we believe that consciousness persists. "*Persistence of individuals as conscious is deducible from the belief in the self-realising Metaconscious previously vindicated.*" Now this persistence takes the form of palingenesis. The humblest atom-monad undergoes a ceaseless palingenesis. Just as the hydrogen-monad takes different states in different combinations, so the human monad enters into "rebirths." This doctrine of palingenesis throws new light on many phases of the ethical problem, and has been hinted at in various religious systems and philosophies.

To sum up, in individual monads "now blazing with the light of consciousness, now withdrawing into darkness," are laid the foundations of reality. "The Individual is the only concrete, and should dwarf all else whatever." μκρκ.